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Inadequate Damages in P. I. Actions: Trends in
Appellate Decisions
Owen T. Palmer, Jr.*
T HE JURY HAS RE-ENTERED the courtroom. The foreman prepares to
read the verdict. An air of hopeful expectancy prevails at the
plaintiff's table. Counsel is satisfied that his client's case was carefully
and skillfully presented. Defendant's liability was virtually conceded.
There is also cautious optimism at defendant's table. He made an excel-
lent witness. Cross-examination of the plaintiff had been most effective.
Attorney for defendant had scrupulously avoided technical errors which
might constitute grounds for reversal on appeal. As the moment of truth
nears, the outward confidence of plaintiff's attorney most probably con-
ceals an inward uneasiness-a haunting feeling that this time something
may have gone awry; that the award of the jury might be only a pit-
tance. Is it possible that this jury could return a verdict in a sum less
than the ridiculous settlement offer made by defendant's lawyer? Is this
case to wear the label "inadequate damages"? If so, will the plaintiff
have any chance for relief on appeal?
By combining this hypothetical situation with several recent jury
awards, the problems of the inadequate verdict and its contrast with
excessive damages are brought into clearer focus. In Courtroom A, the
jury finds for the plaintiff, Mrs. Tippit, and assesses her damages at
$2,000.00. Plaintiff had suffered severe bodily injuries, including com-
pound fracture of the left humerus, left tibia and right patella, fractured
ribs resulting in a punctured left lung, multiple lacerations, contusions
and internal injuries. She was hospitalized thirty days and confined to
a wheelchair for several months. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of
plaintiff's counsel, she was a non-wage earner at the time of the injury;
medical expenses were not involved. Plaintiff's counsel is naturally
stunned at the verdict. The trial judge denies a new trial on the grounds
of inadequacy of damages. Appeal is perfected.'
In Courtroom B, the jury finds for the plaintiff, Mrs. Farmer, and
assesses her damages in the amount of $2,109.14. Mrs. Farmer estab-
lished medical expenses in the amount of $788.11 and claimed lost wages
in the amount of $2,448.86. Her injuries are consistent with the usual
whiplash accident with pain extending from head to lower back, abdo-
men, and interior chest. She had been hospitalized for several days and
prescribed drugs and was given intravenous fluids to stop nausea. She
was confined to her bed at home for approximately thirty days, after
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1 Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So. 2d 267 (Miss. 1967).
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which she returned to work on a part-time basis. After an additional
thirty days, she resumed full time employment. One of the physicians
testified that the plaintiff had a ruptured disc with 10% overall disability.
Plaintiff's attorney is obviously disappointed with the jury's verdict. A
motion for new trial, because of inadequate damages, is overruled by the
judge. Appeal is perfected.2
In Courtroom C, the jury renders a judgment, with a feeling that
it has more than performed its duty, by assessing damages in favor of
the plaintiff, Mr. Ladner, in the amount of $18,000.00. Medical expenses
in this instance were $2,531.04, loss of income amounted to approxi-
mately $12,000.00, and there was medical proof indicating 40% perma-
nent partial disability. Plaintiff's counsel is horrified at the miserly
award. Once again the trial judge overrules a motion for new trial, and
appeal is perfected to the Supreme Court.3
In Courtrooms D1 and D2, slightly different situations prevail. In
these trials, there was evidence of some contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff. In Courtroom D1, a verdict is returned in behalf
of Mrs. Herrington in the amount of $2,100.00. In addition to incidental
injuries, plaintiff suffered compound comminution of the distal end of the
left humerus, which extended into the left elbow joint. She was con-
fined to bed in traction for approximately four weeks, with continued
treatment thereafter for several months. There was adequate evidence
she was subjected to great pain, suffering, and inconvenience. Mrs. Her-
rington sustained permanent partial disability of 250 flexion motion and
about 450 in extension motion to her left arm. Medical bills totaled
$1,127.30. During her confinement, she lost earnings at the rate of $47.00
net per week. The jury had received an instruction authorizing a finding
of contributory negligence. The trial judge did not disturb the verdict
of the jury, and plaintiff appealed solely on the grounds of inadequate
damages. 4
In Courtroom D2, Mrs. Occhipinti recovered a verdict in the amount
of $1,500.00 against a trucking company. At the time of the accident,
the plaintiff was five and one-half months pregnant. Two months later,
she suffered a miscarriage as a result of the collision. In addition, she
sustained multiple bruises with hemorrhages beneath the skin of her
abdomen. Medical bills total $500.00. The plaintiff had not sought re-
covery for the unborn child under the actionable death statutes of the
state. The trial judge granted an instruction to the defendant on the
issue of contributory negligence. Plaintiff's motion for new trial on the
grounds of inadequate damages was overruled. Appeal was perfected. 5
2 Farmer v. Smith, 207 So. 2d 352 (Miss. 1968).
3 Ladner v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 251 Miss. 804, 171 So. 2d 503 (1965).
4 Herrington v. Hodges, 249 Miss. 131, 161 So. 2d 194 (1964).
5 Occhipinti v. Rheem Mfg. Co., Inc., 252 Miss. 172, 172 So. 2d 186 (1965).
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In Courtroom E, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of
$550,000.00 in favor of Mr. Dendy. Plaintiff had sustained a broken neck
and suffered spinal separation as the result of a dive into shallow water
from a municipal pier. At the time of the trial, plaintiff was permanently
paralyzed and totally disabled. At the time of the injury, Dendy was
twenty years of age with life expectancy of 50.1 years. Medical expenses
at time of trial already exceeded $1,500.00, with the undisputed testimony
that such expenses for care would continue for as long as he lived.
Plaintiff was a high school graduate and had worked as a truck driver
earning $1.25 per hour although unemployed at the time of the accident.
The trial judge, who had heretofore pledged never to tamper with the
verdict of a jury in the sole issue of damages, entered a remittitur of
$450,000.00, leaving a net verdict of $100,000.00. Plaintiff refused to
accept the remittitur and appeal from the judgment ordering a new trial
was perfected.6
For the plaintiffs in Courtrooms A 7, C1, and D29, the Supreme Court
of the state granted a new trial solely on the basis of inadequacy of dam-
ages. For the plaintiffs whose awards were granted in Courtrooms B 10 ,
6 Dendy v. City of Pascagoula, 193 So. 2d 559 (Miss. 1967).
7 "A careful reading of the record reveals that the trial in this case is a typical jury
case. The jury has resolved the issue of negligence in favor of the plaintiff, and we
cannot say that the verdict is contrary to the facts shown by the testimony. More-
over, it is apparent from the foregoing statement of facts that the plaintiff has suf-
fered injuries entitling her to much greater damages than were accorded by the jury.
The case must therefore be reversed, so that a new trial may be had because of the
inadequacy of the damages awarded." Tippit v. Hunter, supra note 1, at 270. Justice
Rodgers found it unnecessary to mention that the verdict was so shocking that it
must have been the result of prejudice, etc. See Dun v. Easley, 48 Ala. 51, 151 So.
2d 791 (Ala. App. 1963).
8 "We are of the opinion that the damages awarded appellant in this case are so
grossly inadequate as to evince prejudice and bias on the part of the jury. A mere
statement of his injuries, medical expenses, and loss of earnings is sufficient basis for
our conclusion .... The jury by its verdict appears to have allowed only about
$3,500.00 for the pain and suffering endured by the appellant and for his permanent
injuries and loss of future earnings." (Emphasis added.) Ladner v. Merchants Bank
& Trust Co., supra note 3, at 509.
9 "Moreover, the evidence shows that the principal negligence causing the collision
was that of Rheem's driver, the jury's verdict indicated that it applied to appellant
substantial contributory negligence, the instruction erroneously told the jury that it
could not consider the death of the unborn child in fixing appellant's damages, and
appellant's medical bills were $500. These factors show that the amount of the ver-
dict was grossly inadequate." Occhipinti v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., supra note 5,
at 191.
10 "The principal thrust of appellant's argument is that she proved actual or special
damages in excess of the amount of the verdict and that this of itself is evidence of
the jury's failure to follow the instructions of the court in considering the evidence
presented on the question of damages, making it evident that the verdict of the jury
was the result of bias, passion and prejudice. As we have heretofore pointed out,
most of the special damage she claims to have suffered was the loss of wages at the
Forrest General Hospital. We do not think that the jury was bound to accept with-
out question her testimony on this point .... We have carefully considered the evi-
dence in this case, and while we think the verdict of the jury is small and we are
not completely satisfied with it, we are unable to say with confidence that the amount
of damages is so inadequate as to evidence bias, passion and prejudice on the part
of the jury." Farmer v. Smith, supra note 2, at 355.
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D111, and El2 , the search for justice ended in the appellate court which
affirmed the decisions in each instance. The initial reaction to the re-
sponse of the appellate court in these cases is that there is no consist-
ency, no rule of law on which an appeal for inadequate damages can be
predicated with any assured hope of success.
There is no mystery in the language which courts from time imme-
morial expressed in an attempt to explain when they will interfere with
a verdict which has been challenged on the grounds of either excessive-
ness or inadequacy. Lip service is given to the rule that the size of the
verdict alone is not the criteria for interference with the verdict of a
jury. The usual language is that excessiveness or inadequacy, to war-
rant interference, must evince or carry an implication of passion or
prejudice, corruption, partiality, improper influences, or the like. An
analysis of the decisions, however, justifies "the conclusion that courts
generally grant relief if convinced that the verdict substantially exceeds
or falls below any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages, even
though the inference of passion, prejudice, partiality, or other improper
notice on the part of the jury is no more natural or reasonable than the
inference of a mistake or misapprehension" on the part of the jury. 13
This general statement of the law has in the past at least been subject
to considerable challenge. If one should study the extent of treatment
to these two "similar" errors in the pages of Am. Jur. 2d and Corpus
Juris Secundum, the dissimilar approach by the trial and appellate
11 "After reviewing all the testimony in this case, briefs of counsel and the related
authorities we hold that the verdict of the jury in this case is not so grossly inade-
quate as to evince bias, prejudice or passion on the part of the jury or that the jury
improperly diminished the damages, due the appellant, in proportion to the contrib-
utory negligence properly attributable to the appellant, and the appellant's motion
for a new trial as to damages only was properly overruled." Herrington v. Hodges,
supra note 4, at 194. Justice Brady applies the customary language in denying new
trial.
12 "On direct appeal Dendy strenuously urges that the circuit court erred in sustain-
ing the motion on behalf of the City for a new trial unless Dendy would consent to
a remittitur of $450,000. It is pointed out that the trial judge did not state or specifi-
cally find that the verdict of the jury was so large that it evidenced bias, passion or
prejudice on the part of the jury. It is contended that the trial judge merely sub-
stituted his judgment for that of the jury. The fact that the trial judge did not spe-
cifically state that the verdict of the jury was so large that it evidenced bias, passion
or prejudice on the part of the jury does not necessarily mean that he did not reach
that conclusion. The trial judge is presumed to know the law and he is presumed to
have correctly applied it in passing on the motion for a new trial.
The trial judge could have determined, as we do, that Dendy was guilty of con-
tributory negligence, and that the verdict of the jury indicated that it failed to re-
spond to this instruction, and such failure evidenced bias, passion and prejudice on
its part.
We have consistently held in a long line of cases that this Court, in considering
the action of the trial court in passing on a motion for a new trial will consider the
action with favor and support it unless it is manifestly wrong. Especially is this true
where a new trial has been granted, since the rights of the parties are not finally
settled at this point. We will not disturb such action unless it is a manifest abuse of
discretion." Dendy v. City of Pascagoula, supra note 6, at 563, 564.
13 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 364, at 470; see also 25A C.J.S. Damages § 196.
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judges reflects rather conclusively that the courts are much more prone
to apply rational appraisal or estimate of damages to the excessive award
and limit reversal of the inadequate award to cases indicating prejudice
or passion on the part of the jury.14
Until most recently, with rare exceptions, inadequate damages for
personal injury claims to support a reversal fell in the category of shock-
ing or prejudicial; 15 the appellate courts carefully avoided a rational
approach in such instances. The only real hope for an aggrieved plaintiff
in reversing a "stingy" jury was to find error or errors, perhaps harmless
in other cases, on which a sympathetic court could predicate a reversal
for a new trial. The possibilities that a trial judge would order a new
trial on the sole grounds that the verdict of the jury was too small were
practically non-existent. In contrast to the plaintiff's difficulty in dealing
with an inadequate verdict, the task of defendant's counsel was consider-
ably easier. If the verdict seemed too large, the trial judge had an oppor-
tunity to reduce the "excessive" award. Obviously, the philosophy of
these trial court judges has varied and still varies greatly from district
to district and state to state. Application of the rules of the individual
states and judicial logic have not been as important as the personality
and background of the respective judges. As noted above, the "exces-
sive" verdict does not necessarily reflect prejudice and passion; obvious-
ly the nine or more jurors who return the verdict are not shocked at the
result. In fact, the award is often merely larger than considered reason-
able by the court.
Recently a group of plaintiffs' attorneys in one Mississippi Circuit
Court District became most disturbed at the consistent action of the trial
judge in reducing by remittitur every substantial jury award. The judge
is an able jurist whose integrity is above reproach. Finally an opportu-
nity presented itself for several members of the plaintiff's bar to discuss
damages informally with the judge. He expressed great concern over the
14 In 22 Am. Jur. 2d, 32 sections encompassing 62 pages deal with excessive awards;
14 sections covering only 18 pages, with inadequate awards. Although the divisions
are not so distinct in Corpus Juris Secundum, the difference in emphasis is clearly
noticeable. No general conclusion, or even an assumption, can or should be made
from such a casual observation; perhaps juries are just more prone to the "exces-
sive" verdict, or defendants are more likely to appeal on such grounds or at least are
in a better financial position to delay payment of judgment and to perfect an appeal.
Most probably all these factors, and others, including the recognized difficulty of se-
curing relief from "inadequate" damages, have created such a disparity in the case
law on this subject. See, generally, Oleck, Cases on Damages (1962), c. 8 (Excessive
Awards); c. 9 (Inadequate Awards).
15 See Scott v. Yazoo M. V. R. Co., 103 Miss. 522, 60 So. 215 (1913), in which the
court did not find too great difficulty in reversing a $100 verdict for loss of leg; and
Whitehead v. Newton Oil & Mfg. Co., 105 Miss. 711, 63 So. 219 (1913), in which a
$175.00 award for loss of eye found to be inadequate. Compare Pounders v. Day, 151
Miss. 436, 118 So. 298 (1928), in which $400 for a fractured skull and hip was not
held inadequate under evidence authorizing diminishing damages proportionate to
negligence attributable to injured person. See also So. Ry. in Miss. v. Turner, 49 So.
113 (Miss. 1909), in which the court found any award exceeding $250.00 excessive for
scratch or laceration of plaintiff's back with several days of pain and suffering.
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enormous size of the verdicts being returned. One of the lawyers then
asked him, "What would you feel to be a maximum award in the event
your attractive and able wife were killed by a drunken driver who ran
a red light?" His immediate and positive response, "$30,000.00 to
$35,000.00," brought the discussion to an early conclusion.
When trial and appellate judges, whose background and training
have oriented them to small awards, must deal with a substantial verdict,
their personal attitudes fail to distinguish between a large verdict and
an excessive verdict. Unfortunately, they are not similarly troubled by
the distinction between small and inadequate. During the past decade,
and particularly in many recent cases, there appears to be a growing
recognition by the courts that there should be greater consistency in
dealing with the matter of improper damages, whether excessive or
inadequate. Changes are occurring. Some trial judges are now granting
new trials when the amount of the damage award is clearly too small.
The plaintiffs' attorneys are perfecting more and more appeals after re-
mittiturs by trial judges. At this time, there seems to be little or no evi-
dence of any enthusiasm by the appellate courts to reinstate the original
jury verdict.' 6 On the other hand, the appellate courts in many states
are dealing with the issue of inadequate damages with a new, or at least
reluctant, willingness to reverse solely on grounds of inadequacy. Per-
haps a few basic guidelines are emerging even though they are hazy:
I. A new trial should be granted if the amount of the jury verdict
is equal to or less than the proven and allowable special damages; pro-
vided, of course, that contributory negligence in a comparative negligence
state has not been a jury issue.' 7 The escape clause, which appellate
courts use to avoid the granting of a new trial in such instances, has been
the theory that proof of damages was not sufficient to reverse the de-
cision of the jury.'8
II. Even in comparative negligence states, strong arguments for a
new trial should be made if the award is less than the proven special
damages, particularly where contributory negligence by the plaintiff is
16 Most states provide statutory authority for appeals on issue of damages only. The
Mississippi Statute reads: "Every new trial granted shall be on such terms as the
court shall direct; and no more than two new trials shall be granted to the same
party in any cause. Provided, however, that when the sole ground for a new trial
is the excessiveness or inadequacy of damages assessed, the party aggrieved may
elect to appeal from the order granting a new trial." 2 Miss. Code § 1536 (1942). See
Dendy v. City of Pascagoula, supra note 6.
17 Vascoe v. Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So. 2d 541 (1951); Legler v. Kennington-Saenger
Theatres, 172 F. 2d 982 (5th Cir. 1949); Walker v. Henderson, 275 Ala. 541, 156 So.
2d 633 (1963); Dunn v. Easley, supra note 7.
18 Farmer v. Smith, supra note 2; Schmidt v. Tracey, 150 So. 2d 275, cert. denied 159
So. 2d 645 (Fla. App. 1963); Grissom v. Dahart Ice Cream Co., 40 So. 2d 333, 34 Ala.
App. 282, cert. denied 40 So. 2d 339, 252 Ala. 235, in which an award of $100 was held
not inadequate although possible skull fracture was involved.
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less than the negligence clearly attributable to the defendant.19 The
plaintiff in such instances, however, would do well in perfecting his ap-
peal to seize on every potential error in the record no matter how trivial
with the hope that a sympathetic appellate court would desire to peg
a reversal on some grounds other than inadequacy. In those states whose
rules of practice require the jury to designate the percentage of con-
tributory negligence in the form of its verdict, the question of inadequacy
of damages, even where the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence,
should not be fraught with as many uncertainties as where the verdict
is general in form.
III. The true test for the disappointed and mistreated plaintiff lies
in a verdict equal to or somewhat in excess of the proven special dam-
ages. 20 The problem is much easier to pinpoint than the solution. Pain
and suffering, partial disabilities in varying degrees, and certain subjec-
tive elements of damages are obviously not readily susceptible to math-
ematical computation in dollars and cents. This dilemma is the origin
of the rule of thumb 3 to 1 or 5 to 121 adopted by the inexperienced, the
uncertain and perhaps perplexed attorney. Placing a price tag on human
pain and suffering, and the other elements of damages not readily com-
putable in dollar value by any such theory, is perhaps a shabby and un-
scientific approach severely complicated by the innumerable differences
in the characteristics of each plaintiff in each case. Tolerance to pain and
suffering, the employment or unemployment of the plaintiff, the demands
that the plaintiff must continue work regardless of the extent of his
injury, the degrees of disability, the psychological effects of the injury
on plaintiff's personality, and many other conditions are vital elements
19 Occhipinti v. Rheem Mfg. Co., supra note 5; compare Murray v. Woods, 106 Ga.
App., 126 S.E. 2d 828 (1962).
20 Simpson v. Clay, 139 So. 2d 494 (Fla. App. 1962); Ladner v. Merchants Bank &
Trust Co., supra note 3; Hunter v. Schembs, 273 Ala. 304, 139 So. 2d 614 (1963). An
interesting comparison may be noted in a general study of cases in the states covered
by the Southern Reporter System (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi).
Because of the special role of the jury system in Louisiana, its appellate courts are
continually reviewing and altering awards, both on the basis of inadequacy and ex-
cessiveness. Alabama and Mississippi judges, both on the trial and appellate levels,
are rather unrestrained in entering remittiturs for "excessive" awards. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court now gives signs that some balance will be maintained and that
the small award will be scrutinized with as much care as the large verdict. The Flor-
ida appellate courts appear to exercise a greater reluctance to interfere either with
the large or the small verdict. There seems to be greater consistency, but there is no
question that the "excessive" award is given greater emphasis. Although it seems
clear that Alabama appellate courts have no great qualms about interfering with
and reducing the "excessive" award, they apparently do not act with the same fervor
with inadequate verdicts. There are few cited cases of a successful appeal on such
a basis. But see So. Ry. Co. v. Norris, 241 Ala. 386, 2 So. 2d. 899 (1941); City of Bir-
mingham v. Cain, 17 Ala. App. 489, 86 So. 124 (1920), and Summerlin v. Robinson,
42 Ala. App. 116, 154 So. 2d 685 (1963).
21 The medical expense, loss of earnings and other out of pocket expense (excluding
elements of property damage) are simply totalled, multiplied by 3 or 5, and the
product equals the initial demand.
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of damages which vary from case to case. Although trying to establish
a mathematical ratio between provable special and total allowable dam-
ages may be a ridiculous and impossible premise, plaintiff's counsel can-
not afford to overlook any argument which may be both effective and
practical for submission to the trial and appellate judges. Somewhere
in each case there must be a minimum under which a lesser award is
legally inadequate. The concept can have value, even for the plaintiff
who is unemployed or whose medical expenses are not involved, by im-
provising and estimating reasonable special damages, by assuming certain
fundamental medical costs, and by evaluating basic earning capacity.
The tort feasor should be grateful that he does not have to bear these
extra burdens, but he should not escape the logical damages which will
follow as normal consequences.
The increased tampering by both trial and appellate courts with
inadequate verdicts does have its mixed blessings. In Louisiana, the
jury's function in regard to damages has long been secondary to the
court.22 There is a growing fear nationally that the function of the jury
is being subordinated more and more to the philosophy of the single
judge or the appellate panel. In the final analysis, most plaintiffs' attor-
neys would be happy as a last resort to take their chances in all cases
with the jury and allow the amount of the jury's verdict to be absolutely
inviolate. The realities of the situation, however, will not permit such
an indulgence. If the courts continue-and they will continue-to inter-
fere with the large verdicts, then they must accept an equal obligation
to scrutinize and strike down the small verdicts. Care must be exercised
to avoid handling the problem by additur where there is no discretion
on the part of the plaintiff.2 3 Although a few jurisdictions follow this
rule of practice, it is certainly not the choice of most plaintiffs' lawyers
who would prefer to leave the matter to a new trial before a new jury.
The additur is merely a further encroachment by judges into an area
which is the province of a jury.
Because it is now quite evident that appellate courts are adopting
a more realistic approach to the inadequate award, there are two strong
reasons why such trends should be supported and continued. In the first
place, a plaintiff whose personality, race, status in life, or some other
intangible factor influences a jury to short-change him, whose lawyer or
witness for some inexplicable reason antagonizes the jury against the
22 Wainwright v. Globe Indemnity Co., 75 So. 2d 554 (La. 1954). But cf. Veal v.
Audubon Ins. Co., 114 So. 2d 648 (La. 1959) in which the court exercised the right
to enter additur.
23 In personal injury actions, the right of the trial or appellate judges to grant a new
trial to plaintiff unless a specific additur is made by defendant is most limited. The
number one exception is Louisiana practice. Veal v. Audubon Ins. Co., supra note 22.
For complete annotation on the subject of additurs, see Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 213
(1957).
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plaintiff, is entitled to better treatment. An equally compelling reason
is that perhaps in some areas parties may reach settlements more easily.
The odds have been stacked in certain instances because defendant's
counsel has had no concern that an inadequate verdict would be dis-
turbed, but was confident that an excessive verdict would be reduced.
With the growing storm nationally over the Keeton-O'Connell Plan, it
would behoove all counsel who are interested in preserving the jury
system for dealing with personal injury claims, to find a common lan-
guage and some clearer guidelines in disputes over the inadequacy or
excessiveness of jury verdicts. If plaintiff's and defendant's bar do not
find such a realistic approach, sooner or later the public will, through
legislation, impose a maximum and minimum award in each case regard-
less of the basic differences-unfortunately, the maximum and minimum
will be the same.
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